The Attacker's Perspective on Automatic Speaker Verification: An
  Overview by Das, Rohan Kumar et al.
The Attacker’s Perspective on Automatic Speaker Verification: An Overview
Rohan Kumar Das1, Xiaohai Tian1, Tomi Kinnunen2 and Haizhou Li1
1Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National University of Singapore, Singapore
2School of Computing, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland
{rohankd, eletia, haizhou.li}@nus.edu.sg, tkinnu@cs.uef.fi
Abstract
Security of automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems is
compromised by various spoofing attacks. While many types
of non-proactive attacks (and their defenses) have been stud-
ied in the past, attacker’s perspective on ASV, represents a far
less explored direction. It can potentially help to identify the
weakest parts of ASV systems and be used to develop attacker-
aware systems. We present an overview on this emerging re-
search area by focusing on potential threats of adversarial at-
tacks on ASV, spoofing countermeasures, or both. We conclude
the study with discussion on selected attacks and leveraging
from such knowledge to improve defense mechanisms against
adversarial attacks.
Index Terms: automatic speaker verification, attacker, spoof-
ing, adversarial attacks
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) technology is now a ma-
tured technology used in access control, forensics and surveil-
lance applications [1, 2]. Unfortunately, unprotected ASV sys-
tems are highly vulnerable to various spoofing attacks [3] where
an attacker (adversary) masquerades him/herself as a specific
targeted user. This has motivated the study of automatic detec-
tion of spoofing attacks [4]. Such countermeasures have been
studied as one of the important topics in system implementa-
tion, either independently of, or in conjunction with ASV.
ASVspoof challenge series [5] is a community-driven bech-
marking effort to address voice spoofing attacks and their de-
fenses. The attacks include various voice conversion (VC) and
text-to-speech synthesis (TTS) techniques along with audio re-
play [6]. Their impact upon ASV is now far better understood
than a decade ago. Nonetheless, vast majority of research in this
domain focuses on non-proactive attacks, where the adversary
takes no direct use of the attacked system. For instance, the typ-
ical objective of VC and TTS is to maximize perceptual speaker
similarity and audio quality, rather to break ASV systems.
Apart from studying robust spoofing countermeasures, it is
important to study the weak links of ASV to protect it from
various types of attacks. In order to identify the loopholes of
ASV, we need to assess the limits of spoofing attacks from the
perspective of the attacker. For an attacker, the ideal way is to
attack within the functional modules of an ASV system [4]. But
this may not be feasible always as it requires access to various
modules of the system. Another way to deceive a system is to
craft so-called adversarial examples [7]. They are novel inputs
crafted with some knowledge of the attacked system. Adversar-
ial attacks have received a lot of attention across different clas-
sification tasks (especially within image processing) [8], but
comparatively less in the speech field. While adversarial attacks
and their defenses can be motivated from security improvement
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Figure 1: Spoofing from attacker’s perspective (a) non-
proactive attacks (b) adversarial attacks: using black-box, grey-
box and white-box ASV.
against ‘hackers’, another viewpoint is general robustness im-
provement. Modern ASV systems are robust to many perturba-
tions, but many spoofing countermeasures lack this property.
Figure 1 illustrates both non-proactive and adversarial at-
tacks from the perspective of the the attacker. In the latter case,
the attacker leverages from information of the attacked ASV
system to generate spoofed samples. The attacker can use the
knowledge of either the attacked ASV or another similar ASV
to generate adversarial samples. The former is more effec-
tive (but potentially less realistic). Adversarial attacks can be
broadly divided into black-, grey- and white-box attacks [9].
In the first case, the attacker has access only to the system out-
put (speaker similarity score or hard accept/reject decision) to
guide crafting of new inputs [10]. The grey-box attacks are a
step further, where the attacker has some information such as
features of the speakers and their implementation, but not their
statistical models [11]. Finally, the white-box attacks pose the
greatest threat as the attackers have full knowledge of the sys-
tem under attack [9]. Recent studies using adversarial attacks
on various applications have demonstrated their threat to fool
the system behavior [7, 12, 13].
Studies specifically focused on adversarial attacks on ASV
have come up only very recently [14–18] and some of this work
has revealed new, potential threats. We present an overview
of these studies. Non-proactive spoofing attacks are also briefly
discussed for a broader context. In general, spoofing attacks can
be performed either on the core ASV system, spoofing counter-
measures or both. We group the studies on these grounds. Fur-
ther, we discuss the results of different such attacks and possible
emerging defense strategies against these attacks.
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2. Spoofing with Non-proactive Attacks
This section presents a review on traditional, or non-proactive
spoofing attacks that use limited prior knowledge of the attacked
ASV system. These attacks can be broadly divided into four cat-
egories, impersonation, replay, VC and TTS [4]. Impersonation
is commonly referred as mimicry, where the attacker attempts to
mimic the voice characteristics of the target speaker. Replay at-
tacks are executed by replaying the previously recorded speech
of the target speaker. Finally, VC and TTS attacks aim at mod-
ifying source speaker identity to that of a target speaker, and to
produce text in a given target speaker’s voice, respectively.
Fundamentally, crafting non-proactive attacks lacks a direct
optimization target related to the attacked ASV system (such as
false acceptance rate). Rather, such attacks represent ideas or
technology originally designed with completely different aims
and purposes in mind; they are taken as-is to execute stress tests
on ASV systems. For instance, mimicry takes place in acting
and stand-up comedy without any reference to ASV systems.
Similarly, VC and TTS technology researcher may not consider
themselves as developers of ‘ASV attack technology’ (any more
than knife or gun manufacturers may consider themselves as de-
velopers of ‘murder technology’). Finally, speech recorders and
loudspeakers (used in mounting of replay attacks) is technology
intended to reproduce recorded or transmitted speech, music, or
any other audio to a human listener as faithfully as possible.
The fact that TTS, VC and replay attacks do compromise the
security of ASV systems is a lucky side-product1 rather than the
original aim. In the following subsections, we group the non-
proactive attacks into three categories based on the their target
to attack ASV with or without spoofing countermeasures.
2.1. Attacks on ASV
Different kinds of non-proactive attacks are investigated on
ASV systems without spoofing countermeasures to showcase
the impact of such attacks. Concerning mimicry attacks, im-
personators tend to make vocal caricatures of their target speak-
ers by mimicking high-level speaker cues such as prosody, ac-
cent, pronunciation and lexicon, more than the low-level spec-
tral cues used by ASV systems. As a result, impersonation is
not a consistent approach to attack ASV [19, 20].
In contrast to the mimicry attacks, the attacks generated by
a VC or TTS system are optimized for both speaker similarity
and quality. The aim of the former, a relevant concern for ASV,
is to generate or modify speech so that it sounds as if spoken by
a given target. This is often done by empirically minimizing a
spectral distance measure [21, 22] between the synthesized (or
modified) and target speech, as a proxy of time-consuming per-
ceptual experiments. Even if simple spectral distance measures
have only a weak connection to speaker similarity computations
implemented in ASV systems, several studies indicate that ASV
systems are nonetheless vulnerable to these attacks [23–26].
Further, modern VC and TTS systems are not tailored for a fixed
set of speakers. High-quality target speaker voice can be gener-
ated by adapting an average voice model trained with multi-
speakers’ data towards the desired target [27] or by condi-
tioning the model using a global (utterance-level) speaker vari-
able [28]. These speaker-conditioning variables are similar (or
even same) as speaker embeddings used in ASV systems. These
developments have made ASV and TTS/VC technologies closer
to each other, imposing imminent threat to ASV systems.
1Implied by desirable properties of the original technology, such as
accurate reproduction of stored audio or target speaker voice timbre.
ASV systems are also vulnerable to replay attacks which
use pre-recorded speech samples of the target speaker [29]. As
replayed samples contain strong traits of the target speaker, they
pose a critical threat on any unprotected ASV system, most no-
tably text-independent ASV and text-dependent ASV without
protection against wrong passphrase. For ASV systems pro-
tected against wrongly spoken passphrase, the replay attacks
require the pre-recorded samples of the same spoken content
and are unflexible. On the other hand, the attacks derived using
VC and TTS systems can be performed by only knowing the
lexical information of the target speaker in a such scenario.
2.2. Attacks on Spoofing Countermeasures
Spoofing countermeasures are introduced to the ASV systems
to protect them from various attacks. An attacker may also
try to attack only the spoofing countermeasures with non-
proactive attacks that are not easily detectable. The stud-
ies on the first edition of ASVspoof challenge indicated that
a unit-selection based attack, produced by concatenation of
time-domain waveform samples confused many of the spoofing
countermeasures [5]. On the other hand, attacks synthesized by
using vocoders showed less threat to the spoofing countermea-
sures [5]. A further study [30] on the second edition of voice
conversion challenge [31] suggested that modern waveform fil-
tering based samples might be comparably harder to detect than
traditional vocoded samples.
For replay attack countermeasures, the replay configuration
plays a key role. An analysis presented in [32] suggested that re-
play speech generated with high quality recording and playback
devices in clean environment can be particularly difficult to de-
tect. This applies to any kind of countermeasure as the artifacts
distinguishing replay speech from the bonafide speech is mini-
mal in such a scenario; whenever the replayed speech becomes
digitally indistinguishable from bonafide speech no (low-level)
countermeasure will be able to detect it.
2.3. Attacks on ASV with Spoofing Countermeasures
We have discussed attacks on ASV and countermeasures sepa-
rately, but they could also be performed on combined systems
consisting of ASV and countermeasures. There are no exten-
sive studies on this direction. Although [33] suggests that ASV
with a spoofing countermeasure in combination might be less
vulnerable to the attacks, the severity of attacks on ASV with
spoofing countermeasure depends on the nature of their combi-
nation approach, which deserves further research.
3. Spoofing with Adversarial Attacks
We now turn our attention to proactive, or adversarial attacks,
which have been explored for the case of TTS, VC and imper-
sonation attacks. As far as the authors are aware of, replay at-
tacks have not yet been investigated in an adversarial context.
3.1. Attacks on ASV
Optimizing input signals with partial or full knowledge of the
attacked system is not a new concept in itself. For instance, ar-
tificial signals (that may bear no resemblance to human speech)
have been successfully used to attack ASV [34]. A key dif-
ference in the adversarial attacks, however, is that the new sig-
nals are required to remain unnoticeable to human eye or ear
— being perceptually indistinguishable from natural signals.
A study [14] later generated adversarial samples by adding a
perceptually indistinguishable structured noise to the original
test examples for attacking an end-to-end ASV system. Ad-
versarial training uses the so-called fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [12] with white-box and black-box attacks in a cross-
corpora and cross-feature setting considering the same ASV.
The studies demonstrated the ability of the adversarial attacks
to deceive ASV systems. Another recent study [35] also used
FGSM to perform white-box and black-box attacks. It extended
studies on adversarial transferability from one ASV to attack
another ASV system [35].
Another adversarial attack against ASV, ‘FakeBob’, is ad-
dressed in [36]. This study uses black-box attacks by adding
small perturbation to generate adversarial samples too, but con-
sidered different cases for practical scenario. These include
studies with various ASV architectures (including commercial
systems), transferability of attacks, practicality of over-the-air
through replay and imperceptibility based on human perception.
A further study, explored the real-time nature and feasibility of
adversarial attacks replaying over-the-air by modeling room im-
pulse response (RIR) during adversarial training [37, 38].
The authors of [39] investigated the effect of dictionary at-
tacks on ASV. This kind of attack allows targeting large speaker
population without having specific knowledge of individuals or
their speech models [40]. They selected a set of non-target trials
that have high false acceptance in a population for an ASV sys-
tem. Given such a trial and the training utterances of the speaker
population, a time-domain waveform, master voice, is learned
by adding adversarial perturbations to maximize the spectro-
gram similarity. The time-domain waveform is generated by
spectrogram inversion once the similarity exceeds a threshold
to have a close match to a number of speakers in the population.
The adversarial optimization of dictionary attacks were found
to be imperative for deceiving ASV systems.
A verification-to-synthesis attack using white-box ASV is
carried out in [16]. In this adversarial attack, a VC system
is trained using white-box ASV model without target speaker
training data (unlike traditional VC systems). As the trained
network may distort the phonetic properties of the input voice,
an automatic speech recognition model is also included as part
of optimization to regulate loss of phonemic information. The
output voice thus produced is not only able to deceive the ASV
system, but also maintains the perceptual quality.
The authors of [18] studied black-box attacks on ASV
through feedback-controlled VC framework. The authors treat
the ASV system as a black-box with access to its detection score
only. This score is taken as a feedback to train the VC system.
The objective function for training the feedback-controlled VC
is jointly optimized with the feedback ASV score. The results
indicated that black-box attacks can degrade ASV performance.
Additionally, listening experiments suggested that adversarial
examples are indistinguishable from the VC examples gener-
ated without ASV feedback.
The above studies typically assume that the system ac-
cessed or queried by the attacker is the same the as the attacker
finally wishes to attack. In contrast to this assumption, there are
also studies that assume that the attacker cannot access the at-
tacked system itself, but another ASV system, used as a proxy
of the attacked one. The authors of [15] consider mimicry at-
tacks where they find the closest target speaker for given at-
tacker using a proxy ASV system. However, when asked to
mimic their selected target speakers, the attackers did not man-
age to increase the detection score. The study indicated that
mimicry, even when assisted by ASV-based, may not fool ASV.
But an ASV system can be definitely used to assist the attacks
on another ASV system.
3.2. Attacks on Spoofing Countermeasures
Adversarial attacks solely on spoofing countermeasures have re-
ceived less attention. The authors of [41] proposed an adver-
sarial training method for statistical parametric speech synthe-
sis, where the loss function for training is modified by adding a
weighted loss using an anti-spoofing system. As the loss func-
tion minimizes generation error as well as makes the distribu-
tion of synthetic speech close to that of natural speech, it is also
able to deceive the anti-spoofing system apart from producing
an improved speech quality. This work is extended for a gen-
erative adversarial network based synthetic speech generation
framework, which also proved to be effective to increase the
spoofing rate [42].
A recent work in [17] conducts white-box and black-box
attacks on spoofing countermeasures. The authors consider one
of the strong anti-spoofing system based on light convolutional
neural network (LCNN) [43] to carry out the adversarial attacks
with the FGSM and the projected gradient descent methods.
The studies conducted with both white-box and black-box at-
tacks indicate that the well performing spoofing countermea-
sures can be fooled by generating adversarial samples. Further,
listening test revealed that the adversarial samples are indistin-
guishable from non-proactive samples.
3.3. Attacks on ASV with Spoofing Countermeasures
Adversarial attacks could also be carried out on ASV with
spoofing countermeasure by leveraging from any prior infor-
mation the attack has about either system. As far as the authors
are aware, there is currently no (reported) research on this di-
rection. However, as many real-world systems combine ASV
and countermeasures, future work should address attacks (both
non-proactive and proactive) against combined system.
4. Defenses to Adversarial Attacks on ASV
The spoofing conducted using adversarial attacks discussed in
the previous section projects the weak spots of ASV. Although
many countermeasures for non-proactive attacks are available,
countermeasures for adversarial attacks need attention as well.
In the field of machine learning, various defense mechanisms
are employed to handle adversarial attacks [9, 46]. They can
be categorized into passive and proactive defenses. The former
aims to counter adversarial attacks without modifying the at-
tacked system model. Proactive defenses, in turn, aim at train-
ing new models that are robust to adversarial samples. Moti-
vated by such directions, there are some recent works that ex-
plore defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks on ASV.
Adversarial regularization is addressed in [44] to protect
end-to-end ASV from adversarial attacks. The studies first gen-
erate adversarial samples by FGSM and local distributional
smoothness (LDS) [47] method that are found to fool the ASV
system. Therefore, the model is retrained with adversarial reg-
ularization as a defense mechanism. This mechanism aims at
finding a worst spot around the current data point, and then op-
timize using this worst data point to derive a robust model [44].
The regularization is studied for both methods (FGSM-REG
and LDS-REG) and is found to improve ASV performance
against adversarial attacks.
Spoofing countermeasures also require defense mecha-
nisms against adversarial attacks. A passive defense method
namely, spatial smoothing [48] and another proactive method
namely, adversarial training are studied to defend adversarial
attacks for spoofing countermeasures [45]. The former is a sim-
Table 1: ASV and spoofing countermeasure (CM) performance before (B), after (A) adversarial attacks, and post defense (D) applied (if
any) in different metrics, accuracy (ACC), equal error rate (EER), attack success rate (ASR), spoofing rate (SR) and score comparison.
Adversarial Attack/ Defense Attack Type ASV/CM System Corpus Performance (B/A/D) Metric
Adding perturbation [14] White/black-box End-to-end YOHO, NTIMIT 87.50/25.75/- (white-box) ACC (%)
Adding perturbation [35] White/black-box x-vector, i-vector VoxCeleb1 7.20/8.83/- (black-box, i-vector) EER (%)
Adding perturbation [36] Black-box i-vector, GMM-UBM LibriSpeech -/70/- (i-vector) ASR (%)
Adding perturbation with RIR [37] White-box x-vector VCTK 10/50/- ASR (%)
Adding perturbation with RIR [38] White-box x-vector VCTK 1.33/90.19/- ASR (%)
Dictionary attack [39] White-box VGGVox VoxCeleb2 -/20 (female), 10 (male)/- SR (%)
VC with feedback loss [16] White-box d-vector Japanese data NA Scores
Feedback-controlled VC [18] Black-box i-vector ASVspoof 2019 29.25/30.73/- EER (%)
ASV assisted mimicry [15] Black-box x-vector, i-vector VoxCeleb, self-collected NA Scores
TTS with feedback loss [41, 42] White-box DNN ATR Japanese NA SR plot
Adding noise [17] White/black-box LCNN, SENet ASVspoof 2019 3.87/4.69/- (white-box, LCNN) EER (%)
Adding perturbation/ White-box End-to-end TIMIT 4.87/11.89/8.31 EER (%)FGSM-REG, LDS-REG [44] (FGSM-REG)
Adding perturbation/spatial White-box SENet, VGG ASVspoof 2019 99.97/48.32/93.76 ACC (%)smoothing, adversarial training [45] (Adversarial training, SENet)
ple method, where a slicing window moves over the power spec-
trum, then performs smoothing by use of filters such as median,
mean and Gaussian, commonly used in the field of image pro-
cessing. The general idea behind these simple noise suppression
techniques is to suppress the impact of adversarial perturbations
that are noise-like. The latter, in turn, leverages from adversar-
ial samples at the training stage to improve robustness against
attacks. Both methods are investigated on two spoofing coun-
termeasures and are found as effective defense methods against
the adversarial attacks.
5. Summary and Discussion
Before concluding, we summarize the cited literature on ad-
versarial attacks and their defenses in Table 1. Generally, the
studies are diverse in terms of the adversarial attacks, attacked
systems, datasets and metrics. While these differences make
it impossible to compare different studies, the available perfor-
mance numbers within studies (when available) suggest that the
adversarial attacks can severely degrade the ASV performance
and that defenses are required for safeguarding systems from
such attacks. Further, although the white-box attacks suggest a
higher relative threat (as one might expect), black-box attacks
might be more realistic; if the attacker already has full access to
the system details, does he/she need to bother about generating
spoofed samples?
The defense mechanisms in [44, 45] contributes to defend
adversarial attacks as observed from Table 1. However, these
methods learn to resist particular kind of attack in most cases.
Therefore, such defense methods might be less effective when
the attacker changes the settings of the attack [49].
To address such problem ensemble adversarial training is
employed that generates a larger adversarial training examples
by attacking several different models and then train the model
by transferring the examples [46]. This kind of defense mech-
anism might be more favorable from the outlook of practical
systems, where the nature of adversarial attacks is always un-
known. The challenges associated with unknown attacks has
already been noted in the context of ASVspoof challenges. The
evaluation data (provided without ground-truth to participants)
have purposefully included some ‘surprises’ — attacks not in-
cluded in the training data, and these have turned out difficult to
detect.
We find the adversarial attacks that are proactive in nature,
have a definite impact for knowing the weak spots of ASV sys-
tems as discussed throughout the paper. Nevertheless, the de-
fense mechanisms to tackle such attacks are more imperative
for improving system robustness in real-world scenario. This
remains as an important direction for futuristic ASV systems.
6. Conclusions
The overview presented in this work shows that the proactive
or adversarial attacks have a higher threat to ASV than the non-
proactive attacks. However, they are less explored and the exist-
ing studies are dispersed across different dataset designs, differ-
ent ways to evaluate various attacks and their defenses. Further,
considering the practicality of adversarial attacks and their de-
fenses, there is a need to have a common protocol, performance
metric, and corpus for future research. The special session on
The Attacker’s Perspective on ASV in Interspeech 2020 orga-
nized by the authors is a small step towards this direction.
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